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Abstract—We propose an efficient scheme for generating fake
network traffic to disguise the real event notification in the
presence of a global eavesdropper, which is especially relevant for
the quality of service in delay-intolerant applications monitoring
rare and spatially sparse events, and deployed as large wireless
sensor networks with single data collector. The efficiency of the
scheme that provides statistical source anonymity is achieved by
partitioning network nodes randomly into several node groups.
Members of the same group collectively emulate both temporal
and spatial distribution of the event. Under such dummy-traffic
framework of the source anonymity protection, we aim to better
model the global eavesdropper, especially her way of using
statistical tests to detect the real event, and to present the
quality of the location protection as relative to the adversary’s
strength. In addition, our approach aims to reduce the per-event
work spent to generate the fake traffic while, most importantly,
providing a guaranteed latency in reporting the event. The
latency is controlled by decoupling the routing from the fake-
traffic schedule. We believe that the proposed source anonymity
protection strategy, and the quality evaluation framework, are
well justified by the abundance of the applications that monitor
a rare event with known temporal statistics, and uniform spatial
distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy issues are an important aspect of monitoring appli-
cations in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). A recent survey
of state-of-the-art research on privacy protection in WSNs [5],
among other problems, reviews strategies to protect the object
observed by a WSN node, referred to as source, from the
global eavesdropper (Eve) [4], which can infer the location of
the object based on the established location of the source.
A. Problem Description
The observed object may be a smuggler crossing the border,
an important person entering a classified area, or endangered
animals monitored in their habitats. Messages from the source
are propagated in a traditional hop-by-hop manner, and di-
rected to a fixed data collector, referred to as a base station,
or a sink. Sink protection is not an issue as the adversary
usually knows the sink, in fact she may even know the whole
topology of the sensor network. In addition, Eve detects the
timing and location of all transmissions in the network (hence
global); she can hear and capture any packet sent in the
network (either with a very powerful antenna or she has her
own sensor network deployed in the area). Eve is powerful: she
can employ complex statistical algorithms for detection, and
arbitrary localization techniques. However, the message itself
is encrypted and Eve does not know the encryption, hence
she cannot capture the message and infer the object’s position
from the content. Moreover, Eve, despite being so powerful
and omnipresent, needs to stay invisible. We define outage as
the event when, following an eavesdropped transmission, Eve
reveals itself by taking actions based on the false suspicion that
an event occurred. The actions may involve physical presence
of the attacker or her faculties, in order to capture or destroy
the object. Hence, a false-alarm presents a risk of personal
exposure and liability.
The adversary gathers the source of the transmission based
on the change in the traffic pattern; a conspicuous case would
be when a node starts transmitting after a prolonged period of
inactivity in the WSN. For many event-reporting applications,
despite the fact that the attacker cannot learn the details from
the message content, inferring the contextual information, i.e.
whether, when and where a concerned event has happened,
may be enough to jeopardize monitored resources. Intuitively,
the persistent dummy (fake) traffic is the only way to obfuscate
the events, and the formal proof for it is available in [4].
Dummy packets follow a predefined schedule, aligned with the
expected timeline of real packets, so that Eve cannot observe
the change. To better explain the intricacies of this approach,
especially in light of the existing research, we next introduce
two models of monitored phenomena. Let us first define the
application delay as the delay in event reporting. In both
scenarios, the duration of time is relative to the application
delay constraint, which is a known value ∆. We assume that
the WSN is divided into cells, such that each sensor node
monitors a unique cell and that the events are occurring in a
uniform manner over time and space. An active event is any
event that is not reported to the sink yet.
1) Scenario A: Frequent and Dense Events: This model
describes monitoring of a physical phenomena that creates
on average one event per cell over one cycle, a relatively
short period of time, whose duration is larger but of the same
order of magnitude as the application latency constraint. In
other words, in any cycle, there are many active events in the
network.
2) Scenario B: Rare and Spatially Sparse Events: In this
model, the events are rare and isolated. For example, if
the allowed application delay is in minutes, the expected
interval between events is measured in hours or days. They
are spatially sparse: we assume that there is at most one
active event at a time. In fact, the examples of monitoring
applications at the beginning of I-A all represent the scenario
B. No single node can statistically emulate the spatial and
temporal characteristics of the events in this model. In ad-
dition, by observing a single node for the duration several
orders of magnitude larger than ∆, Eve can not reliably
deduce deviation from the expected behavior. Consequently,
Eve attempts to observe abnormalities in the network-wide
traffic pattern. The anonymity protection scheme described
here implements the traffic pattern in a decentralized manner,
so that the occurrence of real events does not cause observable
abnormalities.
2B. Solution Outline
The uniform spatial/time distribution of events guides nat-
urally the baseline scenario for the dummy traffic: all cells
in the network send dummy messages at a constant rate
regardless of whether a real event has occurred or not. That
means that an event would have to wait to be reported on
average for half of the inter-transmission interval. However,
since the traffic in the network always keeps the same pattern,
it effectively defeats any traffic analysis techniques. The main
problem with dummy traffic is immediately obvious from the
basic scenario: limiting the reporting delay calls for a high-
rate fake traffic, which is not only expensive but may quickly
burn out the network.
Our approach stipulates the importance of knowing the
event’s temporal dynamics, but only in terms of the two
introduced scenarios; it allows us to design energy-efficient
protection strategies. It is natural to assume that the expected
frequency of events will be known to both the attacker and
the network architect, given that we design the monitoring
application for a particular physical phenomenon (an important
person does not enter a classified area every single minute, or
even hour), and that the easiest characterization of a random
process is through its first moment, or the moment’s estimate.
Next, among the all-positive probability distributions with a
given expected value, exponential distribution has the highest
entropy. Hence, assuming that inter-event times follow an
exponential distribution of the estimated mean leads to a good
and justifiable model of the event’s randomness. In terms
of traffic overhead/ energy-consumption and interference, the
optimal design would force each node to transmit as rarely
as possible, and that would be in exponentially distributed
intervals of the expected duration exactly equal to the expected
time between real events; smaller intervals generate more
traffic and therefore cost more, while larger ones create too few
opportunities for embedding the real-traffic, especially under
delay constraints.
The second major underpinning of our approach is the
network-centric view of the problem. The following aspects
of the problem are looked at from both the event’s and the
network’s perspective:
• Event is characterized as a spatio-temporal process over
the whole network area,
• Event-reporting delay includes routing latency,
• Fake-traffic shaping is a decentralized process, collabo-
ratively maintained by all nodes
• Energy consumption per-event of the protection strategy
is equally split among network nodes, and substantially
decreased with respect to the baseline strategy due to
nodes’ collaboration.
Finally, our source-anonymity protection scheme aims to
achieve statistical event unobservability. The absolute pro-
tection under baseline strategy is not applicable to delay-
sensitive applications, such is the majority of event monitoring
in WSNs. Secondly, we do not adjust the timing of real events
as in [6], to make the event pass the statistical test under the
test parameters assumed to be used by Eve. Instead, we make
the event pass the test with the same probability as the dummy
transmissions, making it statistically indistinguishable.
C. Existing Research
There are several papers that study the WSN source
anonymity but, in our opinion, propose solutions that are
efficient under scenario A only [4], [6], [7]. At the expense
of substantial traffic overhead, a practical tradeoff between
security and latency is proposed in [6]. This approach, as ours,
assumes that the attacker knows the defense strategy of the
WSN, and that she will use a state-of-the-art statistical test to
distinguish the real event from the fake once. The rationale
is that fake traffic, even if random, is designed to follow a
distribution, while the real events may not. According to [6],
the event sources should run the same test, and adjust the time
of the real event to pass the test. The event sources test and
correct the intervals between their own transmissions of fake
and real events, striving to maintain their exponentiality. The
paper compares two varieties of this approach: one in which
the real event embeds itself by waiting until next scheduled
transmission (ProbRate), and another one (FitProbRate), when
it waits as little as needed to pass the goodness-of-fit test
for the exponential distribution, inferred from the previous
transmissions. The latter approach results in smaller delay, but
requires the correction of the schedule, quite likely for all the
post-event transmissions.
We further observe that the scheme proposed in [6] defines
delay as the time between the event occurrence and the
source’s transmission, which holds only for WSN applications
in which the sink is one hop away from any source. If
the packet is delivered to the sink in a hop-by-hop manner,
the latency includes another random part due to summation
of the exponentially distributed delays associated with such
transmission schedule of each relay. We refer to this additional
delay as the publishing route (PR) latency. When the expected
value λ of the inter-transmission times is the same at each
node, as in [6], and designed to imitate a relatively rare event
pattern, for the source-sink route of h hops, the PR latency
becomes an Erlang-distributed random variable with mean hλ.
From this point of view too, Scenario B requires a modified
approach to source anonymity. For the cases simulated in [6] ,
the mean of dummy message intervals is 20s, and real events
arrive according to a Poisson process with the rate changing
from 1/20 to 1/100. Their protection scheme achieves the
average latency of less than 1s. If we replace seconds with
hours, having in mind events that happen once a day, or once
a couple of days, the delay of one hour does not seem to
be acceptable. Additionally, the PR latency for rare events is
prohibitive, even for applications that are not delay-sensitive.
To decrease the overhead of the dummy protection scheme
in [6], in [7] the same authors propose a WSN with several
proxy nodes, which pick up transmissions from surrounding
nodes, and filter out the dummy packets. Apart from requiring
mitigating solutions, frequent dummy traffic inevitably leads
to interference, which additionally increases the PR latency.
The next section briefly introduces our solution to this
3problem. Section III describes and analyzes two decentral-
ized algorithms that implement the proposed solution: one
is suitable for uniform spatio-temporal distribution of events,
while another is more resilient to the distribution outliers
(spatial clusters, and temporal bursts of events), however, more
expensive in terms of overhead. Section IV motivates and
presents some of the simulations, while some are left out due
to space constraints. Finally, in V, we conclude.
II. OUR APPROACH
A. System Model
We have a static WSN of n nodes. There is one static sink
collecting event notifications from all nodes. The monitoring
application is delay sensitive: the time between the event
occurrence and the sink’s notification must be smaller than
∆. We assume that monitored events have Poisson temporal
distribution of a known rate λ = 1/µ, and uniform spatial
distribution over the area of network deployment. Hence,
the time between the events is distributed according to a
exponential distribution ζµ (of expected value µ >> ∆). The
source is assumed to transmit a burst of packets, all describing
the event. Due to space limitations, we here analyze the burst
of unit length (one packet), although our second algorithm
is designed for exponential distributions perturbed by both
random outliers and event bursts.
B. Problem Formulation
We established that the only way to confuse Eve is
through persistent network-wide transmissions. Simultane-
ously, as hop-by-hop is prevalent data transfer model in WSNs,
and distance to a sink may be considerable, to satisfy the
application latency constraints, we need to decouple routing
from the fake traffic schedule by allowing immediate relaying
of event notifications as opposed to piggybacking them on the
existing fake transmissions. However, as such a route may
be backtraced to the source, a similar routing path should
be emulated from each fake source (see Figure 1). Given
the mentioned constraints, our goal is to achieve statistically
strong source anonymity through methods that optimize energy
and delay [4]. We hereby propose a pattern of fake traffic
that scales well with network size, and satisfies application-
latency constraints, while protecting the source location up to
a given significance level, defined under the strong statistical
tests available to Eve [3], [10]. To confuse Eve, we propose
to replicate the spatio-temporal process through the following
mechanisms:
• Source Emulation: a subset of d nodes regularly wakes
up to act as dummy sources. As a result, any real event
is covered by d dummy sources, which we refer to as
dummy population. To explain what it means for an event
to be covered, we introduce a time interval, dubbed round,
whose duration is equal to the expected inter-event time.
Hence, the length of a round is µ. Covering an event
implies the expected existence of fake transmissions in
the same round in which the event occurs. To engage all
nodes equally, we may divide the network in d groups and
assign one representative of the group to a distinct round.
Each group will maintain a schedule that emulates the
event distribution ζµ. Due to the size of the dummy popu-
lation, the probability distribution of the intervals between
any two consecutive dummy events is ζµ/d (exponential
of expected value µ/d). Such cooperative shaping of
the fake traffic in order to emulate a sufficiently dense
Poisson distribution is amenable to distributed imple-
mentation, which is thoroughly explained in Section III.
However, as the attacker overhears every transmission
that occurs in the network, and may integrate all recorded
temporal data into one global network activity timeline,
it is judicious to ignore for a moment the decentralized
implementation. Instead, we look at the global timeline as
if it was produced by a single source sampling the values
of event inter-arrivals from the distribution ζµ/d. The joint
empirical distribution of inter-transmission times, created
by extending the fake schedule with the immediate (un-
delayed) transmissions of real events, is, based on the
transmissions’ independence, ζµ/(d+1), i.e. exponential
with the expected value µ/(d + 1). For sufficiently
large d, ζµ/(d+1) does not diverge perceptibly from the
distribution on the global timeline of fake events ζµ/d).
• Route Emulation: each source (dummy or real) forwards
the packet along a predetermined route towards the sink
(see Figure 1). The inter-transmission time between relays
is constant and significantly shorter than ∆ (and, conse-
quently, orders of magnitude smaller than µ, as opposed
to [6] where it is tied to the inter-transmission time of
dummy sources). As the real source starts transmitting
without delay, the application latency is equal to the
routing delay, which is now decoupled from the time
dynamics of the fake traffic, and can be further optimized
by minimizing the number of hops.
• Knowing the Attacker’s Detection Methods: Eve is
assumed to be able to estimate the distribution of recorded
transmission times. The estimated distribution is used as
a reference point in the real-event detection strategy that
involves a statistical test. We base our analysis on the
assumption of a single statistical test, namely Anderson-
Darling (A-D) test for exponentiality [3]. Apart from the
motives of simplicity, and the existence of a reference
that employs the same test [6], the additional arguments
can be found in [1]. The A-D test belongs to the class
of goodness-of-fit tests that evaluate the distance between
the distribution of the sample data and a specified prob-
ability distribution. Alternatively, the test evaluates if the
current sample comes from the same distribution as the
previously evaluated ones. If the distance is statistically
significant, where the significance level is derived from a
parameter of the test, which also defines the percentage
FA of false alarms, it is decided that data do not follow
this distribution.
As the latency issue is decoupled from the fake traffic de-
sign, we seek to determine the minimal dummy population
size needed to secure a given statistical anonymity, hence
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Fig. 1. Dummy population of size d accompanies an event; nodes have been
assigned the round index j at the initialization.
minimizing the overhead. For a WSN of size n, we define
Wn as per-event and per-round energy consumption of the
source anonymity mechanism. We express Wn in terms of
the number of packet-forwarding hops, where we upper-bound
the length of the publishing route by h = O
(√
n
logn
)
[9].
Hence, the cost of each fake source transmission will be
of the same order. With d fake sources covering each real
event, Wn = O
(
(d+ 1)
√
n
logn
)
, which demonstrates the
importance of optimizing d, as the source anonymity calls for
a sufficiently large d. However, note that d would have to be
on the order of
√
n logn to exert the same overhead as the
method in [6].
III. DECENTRALIZED GENERATION OF FAKE TRAFFIC
A. Baseline Decentralized Algorithm
In Section II we highlighted the importance of coopera-
tive and distributed shaping of the fake traffic that should
result in sufficiently dense Poisson distribution of dummy
transmissions. Let us now propose the realization of such
a decentralized system. We first establish the baseline for
the decentralized implementation. As the dummy population
covering each event needs to include on average d fake
sources, we define en epoch of duration T = µnd in which each
network node will get to be a dummy once. Then, we let each
node draw a time instant to transmit in this epoch by sampling
uniform distribution U(0, T ). The causality of transmissions
will arrange all node samples in increasing order, resulting in
exponential distribution ζµ/d of inter-transmission times. The
procedure can be extended to the consecutive epochs, so that
in the ith epoch nodes draw their transmission times from
U((i− 1)T, iT ). Note that the particular uniform distribution
range does not overlap with the ranges of distributions per-
taining to other epochs. The collective empirical distribution
of transmission times is the distribution of almost independent
disjoint events, and therefore it approximates the Poisso-
nian distribution. The independence of transmission events
is broken only on the boundary of the epochs, as with each
new epoch the nodes sample from a uniform distribution of
different disjoint range. Hence, the distribution of the interval
Z between the first event in the new epoch and the last event
in the previous epoch is not exponential.
Z = T + U − V
= T +min {X1, · · · , Xn} −max {X1, · · · , Xn} . (1)
FU (u) = P (U ≤ u) = 1− P (U > u)
= 1−
n∏
i=1
P (Xi > u)
= 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− P (Xi ≤ u))
= 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− FX(u)) = 1− (1− FX(u))n . (2)
The probability distribution for U is
fU (u) = n (1− FX(u))n−1 fX(u)
=
d
µ
(
1− u
T
)n−1
, for T ≥ u ≥ 0, (3)
and o.w. 0, which is for sufficiently large n clearly exponential
distribution of expected value µd
fU (u) ≈ 1µ
d
e
−
u
µ
d . (4)
Further,
FV (v) = P (V ≤ v) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi ≤ v)
=
n∏
i=1
FX(v) = F
n
X(v). (5)
fV (v) = nF
n−1
X (v)fX(v) =
d
µ
( v
T
)n−1
, (6)
for T ≥ v ≥ 0. For sufficiently large n
fV (v) =
d
µ
e
−
T−v
µ
d . (7)
For W = T − V, fW (w) = dµe
−
w
µ
d , where now
Z = U +W. (8)
The random variable Z has a range [0, 2T ] , and, from (8), its
probability distribution is Erlang, with the shape parameter of
2, denoted ǫ(2,µ
d
):
fZ(z) =
∫ T
0
fU (τ)fW (z − τ)dτ
=
∫ z
0
d
µ
e
−
τ
µ
d
d
µ
e
−
z−τ
µ
d dτ = z
d2
µ2
e
−
z
µ
d . (9)
As the probability of an inter-epoch sample in the collection
of test samples of size t, where t < n, is 1t or 0, the average
test-failure probability will be at most 1tFAE+
t−1
t FA, where
FAE denotes failure probability when Erlang-distributed sam-
ples are tested on exponentiality. Even though the distribu-
5tion of Z differs from ζµ/d, we observe that the baseline
decentralized implementation will pass the exponentiality test
for any reasonable size of t (no estimate is made based
on 3 samples). Such a distribution satisfies our needs for
real-event obfuscation. However, for other reasons, related to
cases when the outliers of the real-event temporal distribution
coincide with the spatial correlation of events, we propose
the following realization of the dummy traffic, dubbed group
implementation.
B. Group Algorithm
In the initialization, the WSN nodes are divided into d
groups of size ⌊n/d⌋, and every node in the group is as-
signed an index i, denoting the round in which the node
will cover the source. Hence, the kth round, where k ≡
i mod ⌊n/d⌋ , i ∈ {1, ⌊n/d⌋} , will have a dummy population
of d nodes belonging to different groups. A group schedule
is created by letting the ith member select the specific time
instant to transmit a fake message, sampled from the uniform
distribution U((i−1)µ, iµ). Such an algorithm is amenable to
distributed implementation, since each node can independently
measure time and keep count of the current round. Once the
round index corresponds to node’s index modulo group size,
the node draws a sample from the pertaining distribution,
and determines its transmission time. As the independence
of transmission events is broken only on the boundary of the
rounds, the distribution of the interval Z between the first event
in the new round and the last event in the previous round is
not exponential. Once again, Z = U +W, where W = µ−V,
V = max {X1, · · · , Xd} , and U = min {X1, · · · , Xd} .
FU (u) = 1− (1− FX(u))d , and (10)
fU (u) =
d
µ
(
1− u
µ
)d−1
, for µ ≥ u ≥ 0, (11)
and o.w. 0, which is, for large enough d, exponential distribu-
tion of expected value µd . Now, following a derivation similar
to (5), we obtain
fV (v) =
d
µ
(
v
µ
)d−1
, (12)
for µ ≥ v ≥ 0. For large d, the distribution of W is ζµ/d. The
random variable Z has a range [0, 2µ] , and the probability
distribution is
fZ(z) = z
d2
µ2
e
−
z
µ
d = ǫ(2,µ
d
), (13)
for sufficiently large d. Hence, with group implementation Z
follows the same Erlang distribution ǫ(2,µ
d
) as in the baseline
decentralized implementation. However, to be able to state that
the test sample of size t < n, which includes inter-round inter-
vals with probability 1/d, will be statistically indistinguishable
from the sample of exponentially distributed intervals, we
need to impose a stricter requirement for the value of d.
The average test-failure probability will be 1dFAE +
d−1
d FA.
Upper-bounding the failure probability FAE (when Erlang
Poisson( 3/ )m
Poisson(10/ )m
Poisson(11/ )m
d=3
Real-event timeline
Sample Window
non-Poissonian interval
U( ,2 )m m U( 2 ,3 )m m
d=10
1 2 3th round
statistically irrelevant
(A)
(B)
m
Fig. 2. (A) Illustration of our group algorithm for fake-traffic generation,
where we randomly form d groups of nodes to cooperatively create the
schedule by sampling a series of uniform distributions. (B) Large enough d
renders small divergence from the Poisson distribution statistically irrelevant.
Bottom axis: for sufficiently large d, mixing several ”group” schedules and
the timeline of the real events (red stars) into a global transmission schedule
observed by Eve, statistically indistinguishable from Poisson schedule.
samples are tested on exponentiality) with one, we obtain
that d should be at least 1FA . If the spatially-uniform events
do follow the distribution ζµ in time, this may unnecessarily
increase the per-event overhead with respect to the baseline.
However, if we have a more complex event distribution, by
selecting the group algorithm we are able to not only render
the event’s temporal characteristics indistinguishable, but also
to obfuscate spatial correlation.
IV. SIMULATIONS
When designing the simulations, we dismiss the possibility
that Eve would test the schedule of any single node, since, in
our scenario, inter-transmission times per-node are large with
respect to µ (inter-event times), and, hence, it takes a lot of
time to record a reasonable test sample. Our primary goal was
to demonstrate the influence of the dummy population size d
to the statistical properties of the network-wide transmission
schedule, both in the absence of real events, and under
different stochastic models for real events. For sufficiently
large d, which is still much smaller than n, our simulations
show that the insertion of events does not statistically change
the time axis. Therefore, by running the statistical tests, Eve
does not obtain any additional information that would help her
capture the monitored object, even if the time of transmission
of a real source is not delayed. With the existing work [6],
an adjustment delay is added, and another mechanism may be
needed to fix the sample mean affected by the adjustments, to
delude Eve’s sequential analysis tests, such as SPRT [10].
Performing the A-D test, which is a powerful test for expo-
nentiality [2], [8], on the samples drawn from an exponential
distribution results in a percentage of failures, which represent
false alarms. The percentage of false alarms is a random
variable whose mean corresponds to the false-alarm parameter
of the test (also referred to as the significance level), denoted
by α. Due to randomness, over certain sets of test samples this
percentage will fluctuate around the value of the parameter
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Fig. 3. The effect of the sample size on the False Alarm (FA) trend (FA as
a function of the round number, each round containing d samples): (A) For
samples drawn from an exponential distribution and the sample size di at round i FA’s
mean stays constant. (B) For uniformly sampled transmission times, the sample size
equal to d includes samples mostly from a single round, hence, exponential samples,
and FA’s mean is constant as in (A) (C) For uniform sampling and the sample size di
at round i for d = 100 FA achieves close approximation with exponential distribution
across the rounds, as opposed to d = 10 that does so only within one round (D) At
each new round we test 200 preceding samples
provided by the test. Our testing strategy monitors the rate
of test failures to evaluate if it behaves as expected for the
exponential distribution.
If d is not sufficiently large, goodness-of-fit tests of expo-
nentiality [3] will fail in a much larger percentage of cases
than the value of the test’s FA parameter. For small d, the
test results are also sensitive to the sample size as shown in
Figure 3 which compares the pure exponential samples whose
false alarm statistics are independent of the sample size (pane
(A)), with the samples obtained using our group algorithm
for d = 10 and d = 100. Samples that span just one round
will most likely pass the test since ordered uniform samples
in any range [(i − 1)µ, iµ] produce intervals described by the
exponential distribution ζµ/d (Figure 3 (B)). Large number
of samples would include many rounds, with 1/d portion of
samples not belonging to the exponential distribution. Note
that for sample size d = 100 our algorithm achieves close
approximation of the exponential distribution as it exhibits the
constant FA mean across the rounds, as opposed to d = 10
(panes (C) and (D)). In pane (D), at each new round we test
200 preceding samples. The same sample size was used to test
the influence the inserted real events had on the percentage of
test failures. As expected, our simulations confirm that the real
events are statistically imperceptible for d > 10.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed decentralized implementations of the fake
traffic provide desired statistical source anonymity with mini-
mal overhead and a delay that depends only on the efficiency
of packet routing. Simultaneously, they utilize the network
resources in a balanced and fair way, and provide flexibility
necessary to handle different temporal and spatial profiles
of the event process(omitted here due to space constraints).
By designing only one parameter, the size of the dummy
population d, according to the known statistical characteristic
of the observed process we achieve such flexibility. The
minimal value of d depends on the implementation, as the
deployment of group implementation requires d to be at least
1
FA . Uniform spatial distribution of events does not call for
the group implementation, and this constraint on d does not
hold. However, d needs to be large enough to render ζµ/d and
ζµ/(d+1) statistically indistinguishable.
Our future work is to formalize a metric for the quality
of a WSN source anonymity scheme that includes the Eve’s
outage probability and her work needed to collect statistically
relevant samples. By including the adversary’s work and
vulnerabilities, we aim to better model a global eavesdropper,
and to present the quality of the source anonymity protection
as relative to the adversary’s strength. In addition, the quality
metric should include the statistically guaranteed anonymity
level, the work spent to obfuscate the events, and the latency
guarantees by the proposed algorithm.
REFERENCES
[1] Stephens M. A. Edf statistics for goodness of fit and some comparisons.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69:730–737, 1974.
[2] Stephens M. A. Goodness of fit with special reference to tests for
exponentiality. Technical report, Department of Statistics, Stanford
University, Stanford, CA, 1977.
[3] T. W. Anderson and D. A. Darling. A test of goodness of fit. Journal of
the American Statistical Association, 49(268):765769, December 1954.
[4] Mehta et al. Location privacy in sensor networks against a global
eavesdropper. In IEEE Int. Conf. on Network Protocols, October 2007.
[5] N. Li et al. Privacy preservation in wireless sensor networks: A state-
of-the-art survey. Ad Hoc Networks, 7(8):1501–1514, November 2009.
[6] Shao et al. Towards statistically strong source anonymity for sensor
networks. In IEEE INFOCOM, April 2008.
[7] Yang et al. Towards event source unobservability with minimum network
traffic in sensor networks. In ACM Conf on Wireless Net Security, 2008.
[8] F. Famoye. Edf tests for the generalized poisson distribution. Journal
of statistical computation and simulation, 63:159–168, 1999.
[9] P. Gupta and P. R. Kumar. Critical power for asymptotic connectivity
in wireless networks. Stochastic Analysis, Control, Optimization and
Applications: A Volume in Honor of W.H. Fleming, 1998.
[10] A. Wald. Sequential Analysis. New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1947.
